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COMMENT
THE GOLDEN RETRIEVER RULE:
ALASKA’S IDENTITY PRIVILEGE
FOR ANIMAL ADOPTION
AGENCIES AND FOR ADOPTIVE
ANIMAL OWNERS
JOHN J. TIEMESSEN*
JASON A. WEINER**
In this Comment, the authors examine recent national and Alas-
kan developments regarding a limited testimonial privilege for
animal adoption agencies and adoptive owners.  Unlike most tes-
timonial privileges, this new privilege e did not exist at common
law and has only a limited foundation in statutes or rules of evi-
dence.  The authors conclude by noting the effect this privilege has
on replevin and conversion cases involving lost animals that have
been adopted by new owners.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in the case of Wall v. Gyuricsko,1 Judge Mary E.
Greene of the Alaska Superior Court for the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict continued a trend established by the Vermont Supreme Court
and the Georgia Court of Appeals by refusing to require a private,
nonprofit animal rescue organization to disclose the identity of the
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1. No. 4FA-01-687 CI, Summary Decision and Order (Sup. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist.
Nov. 5, 2001).
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adoptive family of a rescued pet.2  Like the published cases on the
topic, Judge Greene’s opinion did not overtly declare that she was
establishing a testimonial privilege.3  However, the court’s justifica-
tion for protecting the adoptive owners’ identity—avoiding har-
assment of the adoptive owner and promoting the adoption of im-
pounded dogs—was similar to that given by other courts.4
This Comment discusses the need for uniform protection for
animal adoption agencies and adoptive animal owners by looking
at statistics regarding animal ownership in the United States, de-
bates among legal scholars about the status of companion animals,
and the growth of adoption agencies for animals in the United
States with a focus on Alaska.  The Comment then explores exist-
ing Alaska case law on the status of animals in the state.  Finally,
the Comment will discuss recent case law from Alaska and other
jurisdictions supporting the need for a testimonial privilege pro-
hibiting the disclosure of the identities of adoptive families by ani-
mal adoption organizations.  Should the Alaska Supreme Court re-
fuse to recognize such a privilege, protective orders under Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) should be a matter of course in ani-
mal custody disputes.5
II.  TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES IN ALASKA
Under federal law, witness testimonial privileges are governed
by the common law as interpreted in the “light of reason and expe-
rience.”6  While there is reluctance to recognize new privileges, this
has not stopped the federal courts from adopting new privileges as
justice requires.7  Alaska Rule of Evidence 501 limits testimonial
2.  Id. at 4-5 (citing Johnston v. Atlanta Humane Soc’y, 326 S.E.2d 585, 588
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Lamare v. North Country Animal League, 743 A.2d 598, 604
(Vt. 1999)).
3. Wall, No. 4FA-01-687 CI, at 4-5.  See also Johnston, 326 S.E.2d at 587-88;
Lamare, 743 A.2d at 604.
4. Wall, No. 4FA-01-687 CI, at 4.  See also Johnston, 326 S.E.2d at 587-88;
Lamare, 743 A.2d at 604.
5. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“the court in the judicial district where the depo-
sition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense.”).
6. FED. R. EVID. 501.
7. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (recognizing common law
privilege protecting confidential communications between psychotherapist and
patient); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976,
982 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a privilege on communications made during set-
tlement talks); Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 72 (3rd Cir. 2000) (finding waiver of
patient-psychotherapist privilege, but ordering District Court to consider possibil-
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privileges to those provided by the Constitution of the United
States, the Alaska Constitution, enactments of the Alaska Legisla-
ture, the Rules of Evidence or other rules promulgated by the
Alaska Supreme Court.8  Despite the seemingly more restrictive
nature of Alaska Rule of Evidence 501 as opposed to the corre-
sponding federal rule, the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized a
common law privilege applying standards adopted from the federal
courts.9  The Allred court specifically recognized that courts may
create common law privileges when they find sufficient policy justi-
fication for doing so.10  The principles expounded in that case have
yet to be overturned by the Alaska Supreme Court.
III.  THE NEED FOR UNIFORM PROTECTION FOR ANIMAL
ADOPTION AGENCIES AND ADOPTIVE ANIMAL OWNERS
Statistics show that there are approximately 68 million dogs
and 73 million cats owned in the United States.11  Twenty percent
of these pets are obtained from shelters.12  This percentage has in-
creased significantly from just five years ago, when only 13% of cat
owners and 17% of dog owners had turned to shelters.13  There are
an estimated 6 to 8 million cats and dogs entering shelters each
year, with 3 to 4 million cats and dogs being euthanized by these
ity of granting protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to
impose such restrictions upon discovery as it deems appropriate); Folb v. Motion
Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180-81 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (recognizing a federal mediation privilege); D’Aurizio v. Borough of Pali-
sades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1361 (D.N.J. 1995) (“political vote privilege should
apply to protect (1) from compulsory disclosure (2) the tenor of a person’s vote
(3) at a political election (4) conducted by secret ballot (5) unless the vote was cast
illegally”).
8. ALASKA R. EVID. 501.
9. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416-18 (Alaska 1976); State v. R.H., 683 P.2d
269, 271-72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).  But see Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage,
706 P.2d 687, 693 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (holding that privilege should be nar-
rowly construed).
10. Allred, 554 P.2d at 416.
11. The Humane Society of the United States, U.S. Pet Ownership Statistics,
available at http://www.hsus.org/ace/11831 (last visited Dec. 15,  2003) (citing
American Pet Products Manufacturers Association (APPMA) 2001-2002 National
Pet Owners Survey).
12. Pet Owners Turn Increasingly to Shelters, ANIMAL SHELTERING, July-
August 2001, at 1.
13. Id.
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shelters.14  Further, of the dogs and cats entering shelters, only 15%
to 30% of dogs and 2% to 5% of cats are reclaimed by their own-
ers.15  In seven years, one female cat and her offspring can theoreti-
cally produce 420,000 cats.16  In six years, one female dog and her
offspring can produce 67,000 dogs.17
The number of animal rescue groups across the country has
grown in order to handle the ever–increasing animal population.18
Golden Retriever Rescue of Fairbanks has compiled one of the
most complete lists available of the various shelters and organiza-
tions in Alaska that are attempting to meet the needs of those who
would adopt sheltered animals.  They list 24 rescue organizations in
Fairbanks alone and 18 statewide rescue organizations.19  Addition-
ally, most organized boroughs and many municipalities exercise
animal control powers.20
Several articles written in recent years have explained how the
law has adapted to reflect the increasing role of animals as “mem-
bers of the family.”  For example, one article argues for a shift in
the tort system’s valuation of companion animals.21  The author
cites cases from Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Texas to
show that some jurisdictions will consider mental distress damages
in companion animal cases.22 Another article discusses how com-
mon and statutory law across the country addresses one’s owner-
14. The Humane Society of the United States, HSUS Pet Overpopulation Es-
timates, available at http://www.hsus.org/ace/11830 (last visited December 15,
2003).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Nancy Lawson, A New Breed Of Adoption Partner, ANIMAL
SHELTERING, January-February 2001, at 1-4.
19. Golden Retriever Rescue of Fairbanks, Dog Organizations, Fairbanks and
Alaska, available at http://www.grrf.org/organizations.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2004).  As a Fairbanks-based organization, this list most likely is biased toward
Interior organizations.
20. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, ORDINANCES tit. 17 (2003); FAIRBANKS, ALASKA,
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 6 (2003); JUNEAU, ALASKA, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
8.45 (2003); KENAI PENINSULA, ALASKA, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 8 (2003);
MATANUSKA-SUSITNA, ALASKA, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 24 (2003); PALMER,
ALASKA, CODE tit. 6 (2003); PETERSBURG, ALASKA, CODE tit. 7 (2003); SEWARD,
ALASKA, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 9.05 (2003); SITKA, ALASKA CODE tit. 8
(2003); VALDEZ, ALASKA, CODE tit. 6 (2003); WASILLA, ALASKA, CODE tit. 7
(2003).
21. Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Compan-
ion Animals In Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1995).
22. Id. at 1076-78.
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ship rights in dogs and argues that existing lost property statutes
“must be changed to recognize the special property interest an
owner has with her pet dog.”23  The author advocates recognition of
a dog owner’s property right under state law through registration
or licensing and then the protection of that interest under the pro-
cedural safeguards of the state’s lost article statute.24  A third article
argues that “plaintiffs whose companion animals are wrongfully
killed should at least be entitled to the same kind, though not nec-
essarily the same magnitude, of common law damages as are par-
ents of young children wrongfully killed.”25
Two articles published in the last year have continued the ar-
guments for treating animals more in line with the place they fill in
many people’s lives.  The first article examines the continuing de-
bate in recent years as to whether companion animal owners
should be able to recover more than the market value of their pets
when they are injured or killed as a result of tortious conduct.26
The author concludes that “pet owners should be compensated for
any emotional suffering or loss of companionship that results from
wrongful conduct against their companion animal.”27
Finally, the second article notes that there is a trend toward
greater integration of companion animals into households.28  The
article “supports and promotes the idea that there is a rational ba-
sis for changing the way that companion animals should be valued
by the legal system.”29
IV.  ALASKA LAW ON THE STATUS OF COMPANION ANIMALS
In a state where dog mushing is the official sport and where
there are such a variety of public and private animal rescue organi-
zations, one might be surprised to find that case law and statutory
law addressing the parameters of pet adoption and pet ownership is
23. Eric W. Neilsen, Is The Law of Acquisition of Property by Find Going to
The Dogs?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 479, 508-09 (1998).
24. Id.
25. Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Dis-
tress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a
Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 34 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
26. William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member?
An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and its Impact
on Damages Recoverable for their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423,
423-25 (2002).
27. Id. at 449-50.
28. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 52 (2002).
29. Id.
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limited.30  However, given the relatively low value of such claims, it
is not surprising that most disputes over pets are resolved without
judicial intervention or recourse to the appellate courts.31
Despite the dearth of precedent in this area, three recent cases
do address the status of dogs in Alaska.  In the most recent, Juelfs
v. Gough,32 parties to a divorce were fighting over canine visita-
tion.33  The wife in the dispute argued that “a pet is not just a thing
but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a
piece of personal property.”34  The trial court ultimately held that
the original order, which awarded legal and physical custody of the
dog to the husband and allowed the wife reasonable visitation
rights, depended on the parties’ ability to cooperate.35  Because the
parties could not cooperate with regard to visitation, the order
granting visitation rights to the wife had to be abandoned, leaving
sole custody with the husband.36
The other two reported Alaska cases addressing the legal
status of pets are Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough37
and Mitchell v. Heinrichs.38  Together, these cases establish that
pets “have legal status as items of personal property.”39  As per-
sonal property, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the damage
award in cases where a dog has been wrongfully killed should ordi-
narily be limited to the animal’s market value at the time of death.40
In addition, the Richardson court recognized a cause of action for
“intentional infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or
reckless killing of a pet animal in an appropriate case.”41  The neg-
ligent destruction of a dog by an animal shelter, however, does not
rise to a level that would allow for emotional distress damages.42
In Mitchell, the parties asked the Alaska Supreme Court to
loosen the requirements for recovering sentimental value for the
loss of a dog.43  Here, the supreme court had to reconcile its ruling
30. ALASKA STAT. § 44.09.085 (Michie 2002).
31. See Squires-Lee, supra note 21, at 1076-78 (noting that even where non-
economic damages were allowed, the maximum reported recovery was $2,500).
32. 41 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2002).
33. Id. at 594.
34. Id. (citing Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997)).
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id.
37. 705 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1985).
38. 27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001).
39. Richardson, 705 P.2d at 456.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 456-57.
42. Id.
43. 27 P.3d at 312.
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in Richardson with Landers v. Municipality of Anchorage,44 which
recognized that for destroyed property with no real market value,
the trial court should consider the value to the owner of the item
rather than fair market value.45  The supreme court reconciled
these cases by reasoning that the trial court could consider the ac-
tual value of the pet to its owner, rather than just the fair market
value.46
However, the intrinsic value of a pet is still founded on prop-
erty law principles.  Therefore, owners could, in some cases, re-
cover the value of training, care, and other out-of-pocket costs ex-
pended on the lost pet.47  The supreme court concluded its opinion
by stating that a plaintiff “may not recover damages for her dog’s
sentimental value as a component of actual value to her as the
dog’s owner.”48
Under these decisions, one would believe that the statutes re-
lating to lost property should apply to lost domestic pets.  How-
ever, Alaska Statutes section 12.36.045(a), which requires the
finder of lost property to deliver the property to a law enforcement
agency and mandates that the finder wait for at least a year before
the finder can claim the property as his or her own, simply cannot
apply to lost pets.49  Even if law enforcement agencies had suffi-
cient funding, manpower, and infrastructure to care for domestic
animals, the one-year waiting period would be considered by many
to be inhumane.  Some municipal animal shelters are permitted to
44. 915 P.2d 614 (Alaska 1996).
45. Richardson, 705 P.2d at 313 (citing Landers, 915 P.2d at 618).
46. Id. at 313.
47. Id. at 313-14.  The Richardson court stated that
in determining the actual value to the owner, it is reasonable to
take into account the services provided by the dog or account
for zero market value.  Where, as here, there may not be any
fair market value for an adult dog, the “value to the owner may
be based on such things as the cost of replacement, original
cost, and cost to reproduce.”  Thus, an owner may seek reason-
able replacement costs – including such items as the cost of pur-
chasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization,
the cost of neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable train-
ing.  Or an owner may seek to recover the original cost of the
dog, including the purchase price and, again, such investments
as immunization, neutering, and training.  Moreover, as some
courts have recognized, it may be appropriate to consider the
breeding potential of the animal, and whether the dog was pur-
chased for the purpose of breeding with other purebreds and
selling the puppies.
Id.
48. Id. at 314.
49. ALASKA STAT. § 12.36.045(a) (Michie 2002).
TIEMESSEN & WEINER.DOC 05/18/04  2:18 PM
84 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [21:1
offer unidentified animals for adoption after seventy-two hours and
may offer identified animals after 120 hours.50 The vacuum left by
the impracticality of applying Alaska Statutes section 12.36.045(a)
to lost dogs requires Alaska to examine the recent decisions of
other jurisdictions, which find that pets may be personal property
but that not all personal property law can apply to pets.
V.  JURISDICTIONS ADDRESSING THE DISCOVERABILITY OF
ADOPTIVE FAMILY IDENTITIES
Two jurisdictions have published cases addressing the discov-
erability of adoptive family identities in pet adoption cases.  Geor-
gia was the first jurisdiction to address the issue.  In Johnston v.
Atlanta Humane Society,51 a Keeshond dog wandered from his
owner’s property and was found at a shopping center.52  The dog
had neither an identification tag nor a vaccination tag.53  Conse-
quently, the dog was delivered to the Atlanta Humane Society,
which ran an advertisement in the local paper to try to find the
original owner.54  After nine days, the dog was placed for adop-
tion.55  After the dog had been adopted, the original owner learned
that a dog similar to the one he had lost had been adopted from the
pound.56  He filed a complaint against the Humane Society to re-
cover the dog, or its value, and to force the Humane Society to re-
lease the identity of the adopter.57  The trial court granted summary
judgment to the Humane Society and denied discovery of the iden-
tity of the adopter based on public policy.58
The owner argued that he had title to the dog and that the
Humane Society could not transfer title to the new owner without
first giving him notice of the intent to transfer the property and af-
fording him an opportunity to protect his title to the dog.59  The
former owner also argued that he was entitled as a matter of right
to depose the adoptive owner as to the circumstances of the trans-
fer of his property.60
50. See, e.g., FAIRBANKS NORTH STAR BOROUGH CODE OF ORDINANCES §
6.12.010(A) (2003).
51. 326 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
52. Id. at 586.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 586-87.
60. Id. at 587.
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The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Humane Society and its
denial of discovery of the adoptive owner’s identity.61  The court
held that the power to regulate the keeping of dogs and to enforce
regulations by “fines, forfeitures and penalties” was a proper exer-
cise of the police power.62  The court reasoned that “to allow the
original possessor the right to learn the identity of the adopter by
deposing the Humane Society would defeat the intent of the fram-
ers of the ordinance.”63  Further, “to allow an earlier owner to learn
the identity of an adopter could lead to harassment and limit or
curtail adoption so as to lead to the less desirable alternative of de-
struction [of animals].”64
In Lamare v. North Country Animal League,65  the Vermont
Supreme Court, based on facts more sympathetic than those in
Johnston, reached the same result. In Lamare, the plaintiffs’ dog
broke free from its tether.66  Although the dog was licensed, she
was not wearing her tags.67  When the dog failed to return, the
plaintiffs contacted their neighbors, friends, and family in search of
their pet.68  The plaintiffs continued searching for a month to no
avail.69
Several hours after her escape, the dog was found and turned
over to the town animal control officer.70  As required by ordi-
nance, the officer placed notices in the village store, post office,
and town clerk’s office.71  After holding the dog for nine days with-
out any response to the notices, the officer turned the dog over to
the North Country Animal League.72
A month later, the plaintiffs learned that their dog had been
placed with the League.73  They contacted the League twice, the
second time learning that the dog was still in the League’s cus-
tody.74  The plaintiffs asked that the dog be returned, provided
61. Id. at 587-88.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id. at 587-88.
64. Id. at 588.
65. 743 A.2d 598 (Vt. 1999).
66. Id. at 599.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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proof of ownership, and offered to pay all boarding costs.75  When
told that the only way to gain possession was to fill out an adoption
application, the plaintiffs complied.76  After waiting two days for
the League to call their references, plaintiffs called to inquire about
the status of their application.77  They were told that their applica-
tion had been denied because it was not in the dog’s best interest to
be returned to them.78  They later discovered that the dog had been
adopted prior to their application.79
The plaintiffs sued the League and sought to discover the
identity of the adoptive owners.80  The trial court denied the plain-
tiffs’ motion to compel disclosure of the owners, deciding that: the
animal control officer had complied with the town’s dog ordinance;
the plaintiffs failed to conscientiously search for the dog; and that
when the animal control officer gave the dog to the League, the
League became the owner of the dog.81  The court cited Morgan v.
Kroupa82 in support of its conclusion, which held that when the
finder of a lost pet makes a reasonable effort to locate the owner
and cares for the animal over a reasonably long period of time, the
finder assumes possession of the dog.83
Again citing Morgan, the court launched into a detailed dis-
cussion of the important public interests in regulating stray dogs
and other domestic animals.84  The court noted that a stray dog re-
quires care and shelter, could pose hazards to traffic, spread rabies,
and exacerbate animal overpopulation if left unneutered, and that
due to the inherently social nature of dogs, long-term residence in a
shelter is not in the public’s or the animal’s best interests.85  The
court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants and upheld their
right to ownership of the dog.86
Before concluding, however, the court addressed the plaintiffs’
claim that the trial court erred in denying their motion to compel
disclosure of the adoptive family’s identity.  The court held that the
plaintiff had made no showing that the adoptive family’s identity
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 599-600.
78. Id. at 600.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997).
83. Id. at 633.
84. Lamare, 743 A.2d at 603.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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was relevant to the trial court or the appeal.87  The court added,
citing Johnston, that the disclosure of the identity of the adopter
“could lead to harassment and limit or curtail adoption so as to
lead to the less desirable alternative of destruction.”88  Finally, the
justices admonished the League for being insensitive but decided
that this did not affect the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim.89
VI.  WALL V. GYURICSKO
The only Alaska case of which the authors are aware address-
ing the discoverability of adoptive families of pets is Wall v. Gy-
uricsko,90 an Alaska Superior Court case decided by the Fourth Ju-
dicial District.  In Wall, the plaintiffs lost their male Golden
Retriever right before Christmas.91  The plaintiffs made some
minimal efforts to locate the dog and then left for vacation without
finding it.92  Upon returning three weeks later, the plaintiffs learned
about an organization called Golden Retriever Rescue.93  They
were told that two male Golden Retrievers matching the descrip-
tion of the plaintiffs’ dog had been recovered by Golden Retriever
Rescue during late December, but that both had been adopted.94
The private adoption agency refused to disclose the names of the
adoptive families.95  The plaintiffs proceeded to sue for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and for replevin
of their dog.96
The plaintiffs sought the names of the adoptive families
through a motion for injunctive relief and through discovery.97  The
trial court looked to Lamare and Johnston, pointing out that the
Vermont court found that the adoptive families’ identities were ir-
relevant, and that both the Vermont and the Georgia court had
recognized that the disclosure of the identity of the adopter “could
lead to harassment and limit or curtail adoption so as to lead to the
less desirable alternative of destruction.”98  Accordingly, the court
87. Id. at 604.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 604-605 (citation omitted).
90. Wall v. Gyuricsko, No. 4FA-01-687 CI, Summary Decision and Order
(Sup. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Nov. 5, 2001).
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 4-5.
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denied the plaintiffs’ motion to compel the disclosure of the adopt-
ers’ identity.99
VII.  CONCLUSION
The status of companion animals is in a state of evolution.
The common law recognizes that companion animals cannot be
adequately characterized as mere property, nor do they have the
same status as human companions.  While the original owners of-
ten would like the animals to be treated as property so that they
can recover their pets, shelters and rescue organizations cannot
keep animals forever.  Such an approach is not in the best interests
of the public and would not be humane to the animals.
To promote public health, safety, and humanity toward ani-
mals, shelters and rescue organizations continually seek to place
animals with adoptive families.  With the exception of feral strays,
all of the animals placed for adoption are technically “lost prop-
erty.”  However, treating the animals as lost property under exist-
ing Alaska statutes would lead to a cumbersome, and ultimately
unworkable, system.  Euthanasia would be left as the only reason-
able alternative.
To promote the laudable goals of adopting lost, unwanted, or
neglected animals and reducing euthanasia rates, the courts must
protect adoptive families from the harassment of discovery and suit
by putative former owners.  Any other approach could lead to the
collapse of the animal adoption infrastructure and the unnecessary
destruction of animals.
The cases cited above discuss some of the prerequisites for ap-
plying the privilege, including allowing a limited amount of time to
pass before adopting out the animals, advertising for the previous
owner, and difficulty in finding the original owner because of lack
of identification on the animal.  It is acknowledged that common
law privileges are rare, but they also provide the only means avail-
able to reassure adoptive families that their act of charity and
kindness will not be rewarded with a civil complaint.
Alaska should formally adopt the privilege established in Wall
v. Gyuricsko to immunize animal shelters and rescue organizations
from revealing the information about adoptive families to the pet’s
former owners. Such a privilege would promote the efforts of res-
cue organizations and shelters in trying to find adoptive families for
lost or abandoned animals.  Although broadening common law
99. Id. at 5.  The Court did allow the plaintiffs to inspect the dogs in question
to see if one of them was their dog.  Id. at 12.
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privileges does not comport with Alaska Rule of Evidence 501, this
evidentiary expansion is permissible under Allred.
